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Islamic finance industry mostly uses LIBOR linked financial contracts which 
are akin to debt financing than the more preferable participatory modes of 
Mudarabah and Musharakah. As per the current orthodox understanding and 
practice of Islamic finance, the often cited preferable modes like Mudarabah 
and Musharakah are incapable even in a simple model economy with them 
as the only mode of financing. Hence, they are rarely used. The prevalent 
Islamic products which are linked with LIBOR are and will predominantly be 
used and practiced Islamic finance may remain incapable of providing 
egalitarian benefits it once promised. Ironically, Islamic values like justice, 
equality, truth, trust, kindness, honesty and responsibility are often 
discussed in literature and seminars on Islamic Economics; whereas, in 
reality, the lack of these values in practice is the major reason why 
preferable participatory modes remain unusable! As discussed, the current 
orthodox understanding of Islamic fiscal redistribution mechanisms like 
Zakat and Inheritance also make them incapable of contributing towards the 
establishment of an egalitarian economic framework. This paper proposes an 
alternate approach to practiced Islamic finance and orthodox understanding 
of Zakat and inheritance laws and shows that the alternate approach could 
still be sufficient to contribute towards egalitarian objectives effectively.  
 
Keywords Islamic Finance, Islamic Economics, Welfare Economics, Experimental 
Economics, Heterodox Economics, Zakat, Fiscal Redistribution 
 
1. A Look at Practiced Islamic Finance 
 
Islamic Finance is a growing industry which is constantly evolving and has 
been competitive to reach and sustain its growth momentum amid even the 
Great Recession and beyond. Assets of the global Islamic finance industry 
are estimated to grow to around $1.6 trillion by 2012 (Source: Reuters). 
Lately, the Vatican said that banks should look at the rules of Islamic finance 
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to restore confidence amongst their clients at a time of global economic 
crisis. (Source: Osservatore, March 04, 2009). Some reports suggest that 
assets held by Islamic financial institutions may rise five-fold to more than 
$5 trillion (Source: Moody’s Investor Service). 
 
But, Islamic finance industry mostly uses LIBOR linked financial contracts 
which are akin to debt financing than the more preferable participatory 
modes of Mudarabah and Musharakah. 
 
1.1. Time Value of Money & Islamic Finance 
 
In investment for trade (which Islam allows), the investment goes through 
the entire process of a commercial activity that involves risk taking at each 
stage and any compensation on investment is strictly dependent upon the 
outcome of the commercial activity. The profit for the businessman strictly 
depends upon the actual profit realized after taking market risk including 
price risk. It does not depend upon time.    
 
Time value of money is the basis of interest. Time value of money is the 
problem for the investor to avoid keeping his money idle and to avoid 
forgoing the use of money that may bring positive value to his investment. 
However, it does not mean that the investor can demand an arbitrary 
increase (or is given as the case may be) as the cost of using money without 
taking the market and price risk.  
 
Assigning weightage to investment based on tenor of investment through 
which horizontal distribution of profit takes place in Islamic banking creates 
the same yield curve as in the case of term deposits of conventional banks. 
The situation where losses are incurred would have been very interesting, 
but the money is invested in contracts in which the chance of loss is remote. 
Also, the arrangement is such that the bank makes sure that it gets 
comparable returns taking LIBOR as the benchmark rate. Now a discussion 
on those instruments (assets of the bank) will inquire that how these 
instruments enable the bank to provide compensation based on tenor.              
 
1.2.  Analysis of Diminishing Musharakah  
 
In ‘Diminishing Musharakah’, two contracts i.e. tenancy and sale are 
included as two separate components of a Diminishing Musharakah contract. 
Both these contracts are separated by way of a unilateral undertaking in 
place of the actual simultaneous sale/purchase of units of the 
asset/property. The rent is calculated and charged on the basis of LIBOR. 
The rent increases when the LIBOR increases.  
 
Upon close inquiry, one can notice that undertaking or promise makes the 
contract conditional. This argument is further substantiated by the fact that 
if the client refuses to undertake or promise to buy the asset (in units), the 
bank will not make contract with him. Furthermore, the promise gives the 
legal cover to the bank and is acceptable in a court of law. 
 
Following table compares the conventional mortgage and ‘Diminishing 
Musharakah'. It can be seen from the table above that there is hardly any 
difference between the two modes of financing with respect to the flow of 
funds. 
 
Features Conventional Mortgage Diminishing Musharakah 
Benchmark Rate KIBOR KIBOR 
Basis of Rent KIBOR KIBOR 
Nature of Installment Interest + Principal Repayment Rent + Sale of Units 
Prepayment Penalty Yes Sale of Units at Higher Price 
Rent + Sale contract Dependent Separated by unilateral promise  
In subsequent years Interest decreases Rent payment decreases 
In subsequent years Principal repayment increases More Units are purchased 
Changes in Rent Based on KIBOR Based on KIBOR 
Price and Market Risk No  No 
Price of Asset Locked at initiation Locked at Initiation 
Cost to the borrower Same in both cases Same in both cases 
Profit to the bank Same in both cases Same in both cases 
 
1.3.  Analysis of Risk Taking by Bank 
 
There are several types of risks. The most relevant risk is the market risk 
including price risk i.e. the risk that the goods will not be sold or will be sold 
at lower prices that may or may not cover costs. In ‘Murabaha’ and 
‘Diminishing Musharakah’, price and market risk is not taken by the bank. 
Insurance, import duty, levies, and all other expenses are indirectly charged 
from the customer through transfer pricing.  
  
Had the tenancy and sale contract were made separately, the bank would 
have had to bear the market risk which the bank avoids by taking a 
unilateral undertaking from the customer to lease or purchase an asset in 
Ijara/Diminishing Musharakah and Murabaha respectively. 
 
El-Gamal (2008) criticized current Islamic banking by stating that the 
primary emphasis in Islamic finance is not on efficiency and fair pricing. 
Rather, the emphasis is on contract mechanics and certification of Islamicity 
by “Shariah Supervisory Boards”. 
   
1.4. Analysis of Murabaha 
 
It is referred to as “cost + profit” transaction. In this transaction, if a person 
needs a machine worth Rs.100,000. The bank appoints the person as an 
agent to buy it and before it pays the amount (Rs. 100,000) to the supplier, 
the bank makes sure that the customer signs an undertaking to buy the 
asset. This undertaking by the customer is later used to sell the asset to the 
customer at a profit. The bank makes sure that it gets the required profit by 
locking the price at the outset and avoids taking any market related risk.  
     
Undertaking to purchase the asset once the asset is bought by the client as 
an agent of the bank makes the contract conditional. This undertaking is 
taken from the client before the bank releases funds. This argument is 
further substantiated by the fact that if the client refuses to undertake or 
promise to buy the asset, the bank will not make contract with him. 
Furthermore, the promise gives legal remedy to the bank and is acceptable 
in a court of law. 
 
Usmani (2003) describing the less ideal nature of Murabaha with respect to 
contributing to the goals of socio-economic redistribution in economy wrote: 
     
“The instruments of leasing and Murabaha are sometimes criticized on the 
ground that their net result is often the same as the net result of an 
interest-based borrowing. This criticism is justified to some extent, and that 
is why, the Shariah supervisory Boards are unanimous on the point that they 
are not ideal modes of financing and they should be used only in cases of 
need with full observation of the conditions prescribed by Shariah.” (p. 13) 
 
Commodity Murabaha used by the Islamic bank’s treasury for asset liability 
management (basing their actions on the opinion of scholars that ‘Murabaha 
is allowed, even if not ideal’) took the allowance to the extreme whereby in 
Commodity Murabaha transactions, the subject matter is not genuinely 
required by both financial institutions, but each of them takes ownership 
literally for some minutes and execute a complex sale resulting in a profit for 
one and fulfillment of liquidity requirement for the other.  
 
Similarly, use of sale and lease back transaction in house construction 
finance and in commercial finance is also a transaction in which Islamic bank 
purchases the asset without any need of its own from the same customer to 
whom the asset is leased subsequently. The lapse of at least one year period 
between sale and lease recommended by Shariah scholars is also not a 
sufficient justification as the Islamic bank takes undertaking from the client 
beforehand to lease it after one year.   
 
With Murabaha as an alternative, profitable companies will not opt for 
Mudarabah/Musharakah because they will not like to share profits and else 
would go for cheaper way of sourcing funds i.e. debt financing. Less 
profitable companies will want to go for Mudarabah/Musharakah, but bank 
as conservative financial institution will not take risk with these companies. 
The argument that Mudarabah/Musharakah financing is not possible due to 
lack of authentic documentation and trust level is also very weak. Islamic 
banks operating in developed markets (it is to be noted that the developed 
countries are the hub of Islamic banking) where such problems are not 
found have also not gone for Mudarabah/Musharakah financing. As a matter 
of fact, Islamic banks do not want to take market and price risk. Default, 
credit, political, exchange and other risks are also taken by conventional 
banks. If Mudarabah and Musharakah are deemed ideal alternatives by 
Islamic banking experts and scholars favoring it; then, they would have 
been better off entering into investment banking before they entered into 
commercial banking.  
 
1.5. Analysis of Salam 
 
Salam is an alternative for short selling. Its allowance is confirmed from an 
authentic Hadith. It is a sale in which payment (in full) is at spot but delivery 
is deferred. But, it is to be noted that the transaction approved by Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh) did not involve a financial intermediary. Ideally, we have 
to eliminate the need of excessive financial intermediation and look for the 
alternative methods, some of which have been suggested later in the paper 
and also in my book ‘Proposal for a New Economic Framework Based on 
Islamic Principles’ and more research is required in this regard. In parallel 
Salam, the same problem of contingency in contracts persists. 
 
1.6. Analysis of Mudarabah 
 
One of the major impediments in the use of Mudarabah on the asset side of 
a bank i.e. for financing is that only Rabb-ul-Maal is considered to bear all 
the financial losses. Therefore, if an Islamic bank enters into the Mudarabah 
contract as a Rabb-ul-Maal, only the Islamic bank would have to bear all the 
losses. Mudarib (Fund manager) bears no loss while he has the complete 
authority in running the affairs of the business. The Rabb-ul-maal (investor) 
is not allowed to interfere in the affairs of the business. When a loss occurs, 
the Mudarib acts like an employee of the business and when the profit 
occurs, he shares in the profit as if he was the only reason behind the 
profits. This juristic viewpoint didn’t create much problem during early 
Islamic era when mostly the Mudarib was a poor and resource-less person in 
financial need with limited incentive and authority to enter in corruption and 
no capacity to participate in loss sharing if the loss was caused by any 
reason other than negligence on his part. 
 
The principle that loss sharing should be based upon and limited to the 
amount of capital invested is not a condition mentioned in Quran or Hadith. 
Fuqaha recommended it, but it does not mean that it can not be modified, 
especially if doing so is necessary and will make the preferable Islamic 
modes of financing more applicable. When we make terms and conditions for 
employment contracts, for appointment of Shariah Advisors etc, any 
condition not in violation with Islamic principles is allowed and is used. 
Similarly, limiting loss sharing up to the amount of capital invested is not the 
only way loss sharing could take place. 
 
Furthermore, in Musharakah, loss participation by all partners across the 
board is justifiable because all partners are also allowed to work. But, due to 
the condition in Mudarabah that working partner is the sole authority to 
make decisions on business, making Rabb-ul-Maal completely responsible for 
sharing all losses is unjustified in the first place. 
 
It is considered that in case of loss, Mudarib loses the compensation to his 
efforts. But, Mudarib was not an employee. He was a joint partner, more 
precisely, a working partner. Taking the position that he lost the 
compensation to his work is inviting opportunity cost which Islamic 
economics does not acknowledge apparently. 
 
In Mudarabah, the prevalent concept of loss sharing makes it different from 
a General partnership (all partners have unlimited liability) and even with 
limited partnership (some or all have limited liability). In Mudarabah, Rabb-
ul Maal not only has unlimited liability, but no authority to participate in the 
business. Consider an Islamic economy with Mudarabah on asset and liability 
side and there is no other instrument used, Mudarib (usually blue chip 
companies) with no liability to share loss can obtain financing from banks 
who would be Rabb-ul-Maal in asset side use of Mudarabah. On liability side, 
bank will be Mudarib and the small savers and investors will be Rabb-ul-
Maal. So, any loss incurred by blue chip companies is ultimately paid by 
small savers and investors who have all the liability to share losses without 
having a say in the affairs of the business!  
 
Restricted Mudarabah and clause of willful negligence is insufficient to 
protect them from losses strictly due to business cycle fluctuations. This 
example shows that with current structure, even Mudarabah used alone in 
an economy is insufficient to bring about any egalitarian change let alone 
prove to be more destructive than interest based system. 
 
Let us analyze trust deficit and documentation problems which are cited as 
reasons why Mudarabah is not being used widely. Relax these assumptions 
and now consider there is no trust deficit and documentation problem in the 
economy. If a loss occurs due to business cycle fluctuations, no part of the 
loss is borne by the business that had all the authority to run the business. 
The loss is borne not by the bank as well because bank is Mudarib on liability 
side. All loss is borne by the small savers and investors. Now consider the 
government prohibits interest based lending and borrowing too. Will the 
people want to be Rabb-ul-Maal in Mudarabah with bank or the shareholder 
in a blue chip company which can take all the money, invest it, earn from it 
and if loss occurs, pass it onto the small savers! Mudarabah (with current 
structure) even when assumptions of trust deficit and documentation 
problem are relaxed and even when there is no competing conventional 
banking system is ineffective to say the least. 
 
If we look at Mudarabah as it is currently understood, Mudarib is basically an 
employee who would get Ujrat-e-Misl in case of loss and his compensation 
will feature some share in profit also. He is not liable to bear any loss. Rabb-
ul-Maal is basically the entrepreneur (who has the ultimate responsibility to 
share losses). How is it a participatory mode then? This should not be cited 
as a participatory mode with current structure. Secondly, it is also different 
from a principal agent relationship in corporate form of organization. In that, 
the principal hires the agent only because of his inability/incapacity, but the 
rules do not restrict him not to influence agent’s decisions. Important 
decisions taken by the agent(s) have to be vetted in AGM. Mudarabah rules 
even do not allow that much participation. So, in my humble opinion, we 
first need to justify that how Mudarabah is a “just” mode of financing, let 
alone a participatory one and a most preferable one. 
 
With important covenants in place, equity financing can be used and is used 
widely. It is interesting to study the size of debt and equity market in 
developing countries. For instance, in Pakistan, corporate bond market 
hardly exists, whereas equity financing is more prevalent and widely used. 
Equity financing through shares will forever deny the claims of bankers in 
general and Islamic bankers in particular who hide behind trust deficit and 
documentation problems. Why people invest in shares of companies without 
any guarantee over par value let alone dividend? This is an important 
question to answer even if some financial tycoons help promote the 
practiced Islamic Finance the way it is practiced for commercial reasons. 
      
1.7. Securitization, Great Recession & Islamic Finance 
 
The proponents of Islamic finance argue that the demise of financial 
institutions in developed markets was due to excessive securitization and 
this crisis has exposed the weaknesses in the interest based financial 
system. 
 
Shaikh, Salman (2010) analyzing the tendency of proponents of Islamic 
finance who argue that the demise of financial institutions in developed 
markets was due to excessive securitization wrote: 
 
“But, securitization in Islamic finance is also possible and is used frequently 
in recent times. The argument that Asset backed nature of financing would 
ensure effective risk management is also weak as CMOs, MBS, ABS etc were 
instruments with mortgage loans as their underlying assets. The problem 
was with excessive leveraging and lax regulation and not with securitization 
per se. Securitization in Islamic finance as in Sukuk also suffered a setback 
in Dubai Crisis in 2009/10. Asset backed financing also lacks the potential to 
provide need based loans for education, marriage, financing to pay short 
term debt, salaries, other accrued expenses to 3rd parties etc.” (p. 152) 
 
The controversy regarding Sukuk got heated up when Maulana Taqi Usmani 
critically commented on unscrupulous Sukuk issuance. Maulana Taqi Usmani 
is reported to have said that 85% of the Sukuk issued worldwide are 
unislamic. (Source: BBC News, December 11, 2009).  
 
Aldrin (2010) cautioned that due to the absence of appropriate Sukuk pricing 
model, industry currently uses same pricing benchmark for both 
conventional and Sukuk Islamic bond i.e. LIBOR. Hence, high correlation 
between the two instruments is no surprise; rather it must be a signal for 
industry to make a distinctive benchmark for itself.  
 
Andreas & et al. (2008) critically analyzing industry practices in Sukuk 
argued that compared to the replication efforts made, less research and 
efforts were made on how to innovate and develop purely Shariah based 
products. 
 
1.8. Concluding Remarks 
 
The proponents of Islamic banking repeatedly try to give some logical 
answers to support the case of Islamic banking. These logical arguments are 
analyzed briefly.   
 
It is said that a McDonald burger in west and east may taste same, but one 
may be permissible i.e. halal and one may be prohibited i.e. Haram if it is 
prepared from the meat of the chicken which was not slaughtered in the 
prescribed manner. It is a very weak argument. The prohibited burger is not 
prohibited due to the taste. It is prohibited because the prescribed manner 
of slaughtering is not followed to obtain the meet for the burger. The reason 
of prohibition is not biological (taste), it is psychological i.e. Allah has 
permitted to take the life of an animal, but humans must remember that it is 
Allah who has permitted them to take the life of an animal for food and must 
utter words which signify this understanding.      
 
It is said that pre-marital and post-marital sex may give same utility, but 
one is permissible and the other is not. Here again, the reason for 
prohibition of pre-marital sex is not biological or with regards to difference in 
utility, but it is social i.e. Islam treasures family system and wants to protect 
its sanctity at all cost. The very structure of the family system rests on 
limiting free sex and confining it only to marital relations else from a social 
point of view, humans would be no different than animals. 
 
Proponents of current Islamic banking argue against the viewpoint that 
interest is prohibited solely because of its economic evils (Usmani, 2007). 
Explaining the verse (Al-Baqarah: 275), they argue that the verse was 
revealed to clarify the difference between credit sale (of the type which is 
used today in Islamic banking) and Riba. There is a huge difference between 
interest based economic activity and trade. If there had been a little 
difference, Allah would have given the reason for its prohibition in place of 
the verse in which Allah has declared the advocate of interest as the one 
who has become mad by the touch of the evil (Al-Baqarah:275). Rather than 
being derisive here, arguments against interest should have been given. But, 
it was not needed because the people understood what interest was and 
what trade was.  
 
Respected mainstream scholars like Mufti Taqi Usmani while explaining verse 
275 of Al-Baqarah stated that if this and similar injunctions do not become 
clear to the human mind, it should not become a reason for argument and 
disbelief. However, if one reads the verse 275 of Al-Baqarah, it seems that 
Allah is criticizing using the very argument that no sane person can equate 
trade with Riba. If one does, then, he is like someone who has become mad 
by the touch of the devil. Following is the translation of the verse under 
discussion. 
 
“Those who benefit from interest shall be raised like those who have been 
driven to madness by the touch of the Devil; this is because they say: 
"Trade is like interest" while Allah has permitted trade and forbidden 
interest.” [Al-Baqarah:275]        
 
If argument of interest not prohibited due to any explicit, logical and rational 
reason is taken; then, we ought to believe that Allah has declared an activity 
to be like waging War with Allah and Prophet and 70 times more heinous 
than committing adultery with one’s mother without making it clear why 
interest is prohibited!  
 
Alternatively, if the explanation of the proponents of Islamic banking for 
verse 275 of Al-Baqarah is taken, then, it seems very strange that if no 
apparent difference exists in the economic effects of the two transactions i.e. 
credit sale which resembles Riba and Riba itself, why would someone indulge 
in Riba if the same level of profit can be achieved through a credit sale which 
only resembles Riba. Secondly, how strange it would be to assume that Allah 
would punish taker of Riba so severely, while from the economic standpoint, 
the one who undertakes a credit sale transaction which resembles Riba 
would have earned the same level of profit.       
 
Country risk, political risk, currency risk, default risk, credit risk, interest 
rate risk etc are taken by conventional banks as well. The relevant risk is the 
price risk i.e. sale price may not cover costs and the market risk i.e. 
goods/services may remain unsold. 
 
Though, proponents of Islamic Banking have promised and shown 
commitment that in the long run, they are working towards the objective of 
making a system conducive to achieve equitable distribution of income. But, 
if in next decade or two, the practiced Islamic Banking fails to give a result 
different from conventional banking in a capitalist economy; then, the 
proponents of Islamic Banking will have little authority remaining to criticize 
Capitalism.  
 
Islamic bankers and scholars must remember the behavior of 'Ihl-e-Sabbath' 
and Allah's verdict on that behavior. People of Aylah were prohibited from 
fishing on Saturdays. The fish used to come only on Saturdays since Allah 
was testing their obedience. But, they made a trick to catch the fish on the 
Sabbath. They fixed their fishing nets and ropes on Friday so that fish get 
into the nets on Friday and they could catch them on Sunday. They were 
considered disobedient by Allah on this behavior and they were doomed.  
 
2. A Look at Islamic Fiscal Policy  
 
Supposedly, Zakat is one of the major mechanisms for redistribution of 
income in an Islamic economy. But, there are following complications in 
Zakat rules and interpretation which leads to very low Zakat collection.  
  
1. Only agricultural production is Zakatable.  
 
2. Gold and Silver are Zakatable, but diamonds and other precious stones 
are not.  
  
3. Dual Nisab with completely different values and hence dual exemption 
amount. 
  
4. Wealth in cash is subject to Zakat, but not if it is converted into a 
multistoried residential bungalow or when someone purchases diamonds and 
precious stones with it. 
  
5. The condition of Tamleek in Zakat i.e. the condition to make some living 
person the owner of Zakat. Therefore, Zakah cannot be spent for general 
welfare of the poor. For instance, one cannot build hospitals for the free 
treatment of the poor, cannot establish schools for children and cannot 
provide their dwellings with fresh water. 
 
Due to these and other numerous anomalies in the current orthodox 
understanding of Zakat, most Muslim scholars have allowed imposition of 
taxes.  
 
This is despite the fact that neither the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) nor the 
pious Caliphates (rta) levied any tax other than Zakat even when they were 
aware of the taxes imposed by neighboring non-Muslim countries on their 
citizens. Saleem (1992) gave an account of the narrations of the Prophet in 
this regard which are mentioned below:  
 
a) There is no [legal] share [for the society] in the wealth [of people] except  
Zakat.” (Ibni Maajah: Kitab-uz-Zakat). 
 
b) “After you have paid the Zakat of your wealth, you have paid [all] that 
was [legally] required of you.” (Ibni Maajah: Kitab-uz-Zakat). 
 
c)  “No tax-imposer shall enter paradise.” (Abu-Daud: Kitab-ul-Khiraj). 
   
Hence, Islamic fiscal instruments as they are understood in orthodox 
literature also seem incapable of offering any help. 
 
Next, we look at inheritance law of Islam which is also an important vehicle 
in redistribution of income at the micro level. As per the orthodox 
understanding of inheritance law of Islam, in some cases, the sum of the 
shares mentioned for beneficiaries exceeds one and hence inheritance can in 
no way be distributed. The problem is solved by orthodox scholars by 
proportionately decreasing all the shares. In Islamic jurisprudence, this is 
called "aul" i.e. doctrine of increase and lamentably, they regard it as one of 
the finest accomplishments of human intellect! 
 
3. Conclusion       
 
As per the current orthodox understanding and practice of Islamic finance, 
the often cited preferable modes like Mudarabah and Musharakah are 
incapable even in a simple model economy with them as the only mode of 
financing. Hence, they are not used and will not be used due to the reasons 
discussed above. The prevalent Islamic products which are linked with 
LIBOR are and will predominantly be used and practiced Islamic finance may 
remain incapable of providing egalitarian benefits it once promised. 
Ironically, Islamic values like justice, equality, truth, trust, kindness, honesty 
and responsibility are often discussed in literature and seminars on Islamic 
Economics; whereas, in reality, the lack of these values in practice is the 
major reason why preferable participatory modes remain unusable! As 
discussed, the current orthodox understanding of Islamic fiscal redistribution 
mechanisms like Zakat and Inheritance also make them incapable of 
contributing towards the establishment of an egalitarian economic 
framework.      
 
4. Islamic Economic System: The Way Ahead 
 
In developing Islamic Economics, we first need to present the thesis of Islam 
answering all valid arguments against it and its teachings. Then, we can 
present the economic teachings of Islam which will act as broad guidelines 
for appropriate conduct in economic pursuits. Then, given the limits and 
constraints at the outset, utilizing both the literature and practice of Classical 
Economics and Islamic Economics, we can develop and present the 
foundations, institutions, instruments, mechanism and delineate role of each 
in the new Economic framework. 
 
In my work on Islamic Economics, I have explained it as a blend of natural 
features present in Capitalism i.e. right to private property, private pursuit of 
economic interest, use of market forces etc used along with some distinct 
features derived through Islamic economic teachings i.e. interest free 
economy, moral check on unbridled self-pursuit and provision of socio-
economic justice to achieve the goals of Socialism as far as is naturally 
possible without denying individual freedom and profit motive.  
 
In Islamic fiscal economics, I have explained with reasons that Zakat is the 
only compulsory payment to the government on one’s income and wealth in 
an Islamic economy. Zakatable assets should include all assets above the 
value of nisab except the assets in personal use and means of production. 
Minimum Nisab Amount is the market value of 612 grams of silver only. 
(See Mu’atta Imam Malik, No: 578). 
 
Production is not limited to agriculture nowadays, but the major part of it is 
coming from industries as well as services sector. Therefore, industrial 
production could also be taxed just like agriculture. Services income could 
also be taxed on the same principle.  
 
Investment in stocks should be interpreted as any other investment with 
some means of earning income. Stock is a means of earning dividend or 
capital gains. Just like means of production/income are exempt from Zakat, 
investment in stocks should be exempted from Wealth Zakat as investment 
in stocks means that the money is not kept idle. Therefore, any income 
arising from investment in stocks i.e. capital gains or dividend must be 
subject to Ushr. Similarly, this argument could be extended to introduce 
Ushr on income from mutual funds, investment in other financial instruments 
etc. Likewise, if land/building/house is leased, the land/building/house 
becomes the means of earning rent. Hence, Ushr could also be introduced on 
rental income on houses, assets, buildings etc. Through an empirical study, I 
concluded that Zakat in this way can relieve the government of Pakistan 
from deficits.             
In Islamic corporate finance, I suggested an alternate approach to corporate 
finance in an interest free economy by looking beyond practiced Islamic 
finance and suggested alternatives for corporate finance in sourcing funds 
i.e. i) Ijara with embedded options, ii) limited liability partnership, iii) equity 
modes like Musharakah and Mudarabah iv) income bonds and v) convertible 
income bonds. Then,  I suggested alternatives for corporate finance in using 
funds (investments) i.e. i) Islamic income funds, ii) Islamic REITs, iii) GDP 
growth rate linked sovereign bonds, iv) income bonds v) convertible income 
bonds, vi) foreign currency reserves, vii) making strategic expansion, and 
viii) equity investments in other companies. Ijara with embedded option can 
solve the paradox of unilateral undertaking and convert the sale of put 
option from the perspective of client into a call option. In Mudarabah, 
following two covenants can be introduced. 
 a) Mudarib can be asked to contribute some capital. The contract will still 
remain different from Musharakah as only the Mudarib is the working 
partner.   
 b) Mudarib can be asked to share in loss to some extent.  
These two covenants will minimize the problem of adverse selection, moral 
hazard and agency problem. 
In methods of valuation in Islamic Financial Management, I suggested an 
alternate means of pricing capital in interest free economy and use of 
appropriate discount rate i.e. Nominal GDP growth rate in public finance and 
corporate finance in CAPM, dividend discount model, project valuation, 
calculating NPV, valuing income bonds and stocks.  
 
I also discussed in my book ‘Proposal for a New Economic Framework Based 
on Islamic Principles’ that how savings would feature despite discontinuation 
of interest, how inflation will be checked with central banks not having at 
their disposal the conventional OMO, how liquidity will be managed in 
banking sector when a central bank wants to inject liquidity or mop up 
funds. How and to what extent the institution of Zakat would enable the 
government to meet its fiscal targets and does not crowd out private sector 
with public borrowing and how the balance of payments and exchange rate 




Therefore, all is not lost. But, there is a need to realize weaknesses, only 
then can we look for solutions and in search for solutions, we need to be 
critical, objective, impersonal, unbiased and open to hear and receive all 
possible solutions and then accepting and rejecting any of them on the basis 
of authentic Islamic sources i.e. Quran, way of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) 
and Sahih Ahadith rather than on the basis of factional affiliations. Only 
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